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RACE, FAMILY, AND OBLIGATION

One version of black community self-help calls
upon

middle-class

members

of

the

black

community, namely those who are better off
financially, have better than average educations,
etc., to help those members of the community
who are less fortunate.
middle-class

blacks

And the reason that

ought

to

provide

this

assistance, so the claim goes, is because they
have a moral obligation to do so.
This obligation
blacks

is

on the part of middle-class

a consequence

of their

having

membership in the same racial family as other
blacks who are less fortunate.

So, much the

same way we feel obligated to help members of
our family who are less fortunate, middle-class
blacks should feel obligated to help the less
fortunate members of their racial family. And a
feeling

of obligation

based

on race-family

membership has long been a part of the black
community.
family

Further, if this feeling of a race-

obligation

helps

to

facilitate

the

betterment of the black community, this notion
of a race-family obligation might turn out to be
morally justified.

It is not difficult to see, then,

**********1**********

that this notion of a race-family obligation has a
certain appeal.
On the other hand, one might object to this
version of a black self-help morality by claiming
that the notion of a racial family is inconsistent
with our intuitions about the kind of group we
take to be a family.

For example, races of

people are much larger than the groups we
normally like to think of as families, and, even
if we were willing to grant a kind of family
status to such a large group, we would not want
to have a moral obligation like the one we
associate with our families to apply to such a
group.

Hence, there appears to be a tension

between the familial obligation model of black
community self-help and our intuitions about
families.
My aim in this paper is to ease the tension
between the familial obligation model of black
community self-help and our intuitions about
families by sketching a plausible conception of
family

that

can

account

for

race-families,

inclusive of a moral obligation
members,

and

remain

between

its

with

our

consistent

intuitions about what families are.

**********2**********

I begin by examining two popular conceptions
of

family,

both

of which

I

argue

seem

problematic in light of the two criteria I bring to
bear upon them; namely, the ability to sustain a
moral

obligation

between

family

members

within its conception of family, and the ability
to account for race-families.

While the criterion

of being able to account for race-families is
clearly controversial, I think the requirement of
a moral obligation between family members is
generally accepted as a necessary part of the
family concept.

In fact, it seems in no small

part due to the general acceptance of the moral
obligation

criterion

that

the

race-family

conception remains so contentious.

That is,

since a race-family conception cannot sustain a
moral obligation between its members, races of
people therefore cannot be considered families.
I
The first conception of family to be considered
is centered

around the notion of causality.

There is a sense in which invoking causality
with

respect

appealing.

to

families

seems

intuitively

Since one way in which we define

families includes the existence of offspring, it is

**********3**********

not uncommon for young couples to be asked:
"When are you two going to start a family?"
This question seems to imply that without the
existence of children there is no family.

If a

young couple has not yet caused the existence of
at least one other human being, there seems to
be a sense in which the couple alone does not
constitute a family.

So, at least at first glance,

invoking the notion of causality with respect to
family appears reasonable.
A view of family that appeals to the notion of
causality

has

been

suggested

by Anthony

Appiah. Appiah thinks that a "rational defense
of the family ought to appeal to the causal
responsibility of the biological parent and the
common life of the domestic unit".l

Thus, on

what I shall call the causal view, the family
consists of what we commonly take to be the
immediate or nuclear family:

the parent, or

parents, together with their biological offspring
and this group's life together.

Appiah thinks

that

are

since

responsible

natural
for their

parents
offspring,

this

causally
causal

relationship provides the basis for moral claims.2
Thus, on the causal view, a family is defined by
two criteria:

(1) the existence of a biological

**********4**********

parent or parents and one or more children, and
(2) this group's

common

life together as a

domestic unit.
It seems clear, then, that the causal view does
not allow for race-families and hence does not
satisfy our second criterion, since such families
would lack the necessary causal relation between
parent and child, as well as the common life of
a domestic unit.

Further, there seems to be at

least one problem with the causal view with
respect to its ability to sustain a moral obligation
between family members, and consequently with
its ability to satisfy our first criterion.
One problem with the causal view is that it
seems open to regress.

For example, if one

argues that due to my having

caused

the

existence of my daughter, that it is therefore
possible for moral claims to arise from this
relationship, then can we not also say that moral
claims might arise from the relationship between
my mother and my daughter?

After all, if it

were not for my mother, my daughter certainly
would not exist. Granted, the causal link is not
a direct one, however, it is a necessary one. It
is a necessary

condition

of my daughter's

**********5**********

existence for my mother to have first caused my
existence.
that

It might seem to follow, therefore,

if

moral

importance

is

based

upon

causation, then moral importance can be placed
on the relationship between my mother and my
daughter as well as on the relationship between
my daughter and myself.

Hence, if moral

claims

the

can

arise

from

parent/child

relationship, it seems that they can also arise
from the grandparent/grandchild

relationship as

well.
But then

what

Certainly

without

of

the
the

between my grandmother

great-grandparents?
causal

relationship

and my mother the

causal relationship between my daughter and I
could never have taken place. Hence the causal
view seems to take us far beyond the relatively
small domestic unit consisting only of biological
parents and their offspring, and forces us to
recognize all prior causal relationships as having
moral obligations attached to them. The causal
view, then, appears to be open to regress.
Of course the defender of the causal view might
object to the claim that her view is open to
regress, saying that, since there exists only a

**********6**********

finite number of causal agents, the regress is not
infinite, and therefore not vicious.

However,

even if we grant that the regress is not a vicious
one, it still remains that by establishing moral
obligations

beyond

those

derived

from the

parent/child relationship, the family that results
is extended beyond the limits set by the causal
view's criteria, namely that we must include as
members of the family individuals who may not
be a part of the domestic unit.

Thus, if the

causal view is to meet the regress objection its
conception of family must be reformulated.
So it seems

that the causal view

requires

additional justification in order to satisfy even
the first of the two criteria we are considering.
As it stands, the causal view seems to have
difficulty

in sustaining

a moral

obligation

between family members within its conception
of the family.
Another

objection

conception
domestic

of

to

family

situations

the
is

like

causal
that

view's

current-day

heterosexual

or

homosexual adults with adopted children, are
excluded from the family concept.
surprising,

therefore,

It is not

that gay and feminist

**********7**********

factions have criticized the causal view and have
instead offered as families groups that, according
to Appiah, "could (and sometimes do) occupy
the same sort of role"3 as what we have
described

above

families.

These critics of the nuclear family

hold that once

as

immediate

the broad

or

outlines

nuclear
of the

archaeology of the family concept have been
revealed, we are forced to reconsider the nuclear
family as the only legitimate
family.

conception

of

Appiah thinks that if these critics are

correct, then their view of the family must be
that of a group which provides "a mode of
organization of life and feeling that subserves
certain positive functions".

4

I take it that this

mode of organization, in fulfilling the "same sort
of role" as the nuclear family, can be viewed as
a family based in part upon the second of the
two criteria set forth in the causal view. That is,
a group can be considered

a family in part

because it maintains the "common life of the
domestic unit". Clearly, then, if we accept this
notion of family based upon the idea that if a
group shares a common life and certain feelings,
presumably
combination

of an intimate
of

cohabitation

nature, and this
and

feelings

"subserves certain positive functions", then we

**********8**********

may be able to consider this group a family
without the necessary condition of biological
causality that is the basis of the causal view.
Thus, under what I shall call the common life
view, a family is defined by a single criterion,
namely, that: (1) the group in question share a
common

life

and

feelings

which

together

subserve certain positive functions.
The common

life view, then, allows us to

include groups, with or without children, that
were formerly denied consideration as families
on the causal view. But while the broadening of
the family conception that results in moving
from the causal view to the common life view
may seem initially appealing, on this view any
group, regardless of their biological relations or
causal connectedness, can, given the appropriate
lifestyle and feelings, be considered a family.
Given the potential
groups, the family

for fairly large family
as conceived

under the

common life view may allow for families that
are inconsistent with our intuitions about family.
Of course these groups would not be as large as
an entire race of people.

And since it hardly

seems plausible to think that an entire race of
people could share a common life together, even

**********9**********

if we could argue that as a group it subseIVes a
positive function, the notion of race-families is
excluded from the common life conception of
family.

Nevertheless,

these

large

groups

conceived as families under the common life
view may have difficulty in sustaining a moral
obligation between family members within its
conception of the family.
Consider the crew of an aircraft carrier.

Since

there seems to be no temporal component to the
common life view of a family, i.e. the group of
people so construed

need not have had a

common life together for any particular length
of time, and the feelings associated with the
group need not necessarily be of a maternal,
paternal or sexual nature, and further, that the
functions which this group subseIVes need only
be "positive",s it therefore seems conceivable
that the crew of an aircraft carrier could be
construed as a family under the common life
conception. The crew might spend several years
together enduring long periods of time at sea.
Hence, these individuals are clearly sharing a
common

life; so they are in this sense a

"domestic unit". Intimate feelings are likely to
result since it is not unreasonable to expect that

**********10**********

such feelings would develop under arduous atsea conditions.

Also, these feelings, and the

bonds which arise from them, can easily be seen
as subserving a positive function in the lives of
the crew-members

- if nothing

else these

feelings aid the crew-members in enduring their
sea-going existence.

Therefore, it seems that

under the common life view we might regard
the crew of an aircraft carrier as a family.
But notice how broad our conception of family
has become.

Given the approximate size of an

aircraft carrier crew, in the neighborhood of five
thousand people including the air wing (i.e. the
aircraft crew, pilots,

maintenance

personnel,

etc.), we would end up with a very large family
indeed. Further, and more importantly, how do
we sustain

moral

obligations

between

the

members of this family? Do we really want our
familial obligations

to be this far-reaching?

What happens when people transfer to and from
the ship, do our familial obligations to any given
individual remain even after they have left the
ship?

If so, then any member of the aircraft

carrier crew with whom we spent time onboard
would have to be considered a family member,

**********11**********

and thus we would have some moral obligation
to those individuals.
So it seems that more explanation is required
from the common life view if we are to make
sense of cases like the aircraft carrier example
vis-a-vis the kind of group we take to be a
family. I think that the family conception

I

outline below provides a description of the kind
of group we take to be a family, and meets the
criteria we set out to satisfy.
II
I take it as a fact of human nature that people
recognize resemblances between themselves and
other people.

It would seem ludicrous

for

someone to say of themselves that they stood
unique in the world and had no resemblance to
anyone else in any way.

The fact that one

considers oneself a person in itself implies some
sort of resemblance
others.

Thus,

resemblances

between themselves

that

between

a

and

person

recognizes

themselves

and other

people seems entirely reasonable.

**********12**********

In outlining our resemblances, I think we can
divide

them

into three

types:

biological,

psychological, and historical.6 Under biological
resemblances we might include such things as
appearance and lineage. Appearance seems best
illustrated in the case of identical twins.

It

could never be the case that either of the twins
would not recognize a resemblance with respect
to appearance
sibling.

between themselves

and their

Recognition of one's lineage seems a

bit more complex.

For example, recognition of

a resemblance of lineage between myself and
my biological mother is fairly straight forward,
in fact it may be assisted in some cases by our
resemblance in appearance as well.
recognizing

a resemblance

However,

of lineage with

someone born two hundred years ago may not
come quite so easily. Only after discovering the
possibility of a resemblance between myself and
this other person

is bolstered,

perhaps

by

research, discussion with other persons who I
already recognize as resembling me with respect
to lineage, and perhaps by viewing pictures of
that person, thus invoking again the resemblance
of appearance to supplement the notion of lineal
resemblance,

do I come

to recognize

**********13**********

this

resemblance of lineage between myself and my
ancestor.
Under

the

second

type

of

resemblance,

psychological, we might consider such things as
character

and political

ideology.

When

I

recognize that some other person and myself are
both very thrifty individuals,

for example, I

recognize that this other person is like me in this
particular respect, we share a particular character
trait. Likewise, someone may hold the same or
similar

political

views

that

I

do,

and

consequently I recognize that with respect to our
political views, we resemble one another.
The third type of resemblance is historical. We
might include as historical resemblances shared
life experiences, whether shared by individuals
together or separately.

For example, another

person and I may have grown up together
through childhood and into adulthood; again this
might best be illustrated by a sibling, but it
could

also

be

a

next-door

neighbor.

Alternatively, it might be someone with whom
I shared

a particular

life tragedy,

say for

example that myself and another person both
lost a parent at a very early age. In any case, its

**********14**********

seems hard to imagine not recognizing these
types of resemblances

to other people with

respect to a given shared life experience.
It might be objected at this point that, although
the

aforementioned

recognizable,

we

resemblances

might

have

are

difficulty

in

accommodating an idea like culture which seems
to transcend the boundaries
resemblance
However,

categories
culture,

of the particular

we have mentioned.

I

think,

combination of resemblances.

is

simply

a

On the one hand

there are the particular traits that are said to be
associated with certain cultures, for example a
psychological

resemblance

religious beliefs.

with

respect

to

On the other hand, there are

certain historical resemblances such as common
life experiences.
through

For example, I may have gone

certain

"rights

of

passage"

from

childhood to adulthood in a particular culture.
Thus,

it seems

to

be

a combination

of

resemblances that make up a culture, and we
recognize

this

particular

combination

of

resemblances in ourselves vis-a-vis other people
who we likewise

recognize

as having this

particular combination of resemblances.

**********15**********

The types of resemblances discussed give us a
broad sketch of how we view resemblances
between ourselves

and others.

However, it

should be noted that the degree to which we
recognize

these

resemblances

varies.

For

example, I may have a very high degree of
recognition
between

for the biological

myself

recognize

some

and

my

resemblances

father,

psychological

but

may

resemblance

between myself and a stranger to only a very
small

degree.

resemblances

Thus

when

we

speak

of

among people, we are talking

about the recognition, in various respects and to
differing degrees, of likenesses between them.
Since

it

seems

clear

that

we

recognize

resemblances between ourselves and others, even
if to varying degrees, it is reasonable, I think, to
suppose that we also recognize resemblances
between ourselves and groups of others as well.
Given that when we speak of families we are
speaking of groups of people, it does not seem
unreasonable to begin an account of families
based upon the resemblances outlined above.
Consider the two conceptions of family that we
have examined. Whether we view families from
a causal or a common life perspective, we must

**********16**********

admit

of

some

resemblance

members of a family.

between

the

If we look at families

causally, then there is necessarily a biological
resemblance.

If we look at them as a group

sharing a common life, then there is necessarily
a historical resemblance.

So, under either of

these views we must admit of a sense in which
families are groups of people who resemble one
another. But once we begin to view families as
groups of people who resemble one another, the
question arises as to what types of resemblances
obtain in a family such that we are able to
distinguish between groups that are families and
those that are not. Further, we need to explain
what role, if any, these resemblances

play in

establishing familial obligation.
I should like to begin by suggesting that the
language of family is fairly broad. By definition
a family might be a collection or union of things
which

have

a common

source

or similar

features, e.g., a family of languages.

Although

this clearly seems inappropriate with respect to
how we think of human families, this broad
interpretation
the notion

.

of family nevertheless confirms
that families

are groups

members share resemblances.

whose

Given this broad

**********17**********

interpretation we might be inclined, once we
restrict our conception

of family to human

beings, to consider all of humankind as a family.
But even though

this sense

of family

is

consistent with at least one way we think of
families, Le. the family of humankind, without
any obligation between the members of this
group, the notion of all of humankind

as a

family seems vacuous.
We can, I think, base our conception of the
human family on two criteria, the fulfillment of
which will establish membership in the family,
namely:

(1)

the

biological

resemblances

between members of the human species, and (2)
the psychological
obligation
species.

resemblance

between

members

of a sense of
of the human

The first criterion should be accepted

without much fear of objection. Surely the very
basis for distinguishing one species from another
is found by examining biological characteristics.
The second criterion, however, leads us to an
important point in our discussion, the point at
which

we must

suggest

a way

in which

obligations between members of groups might
be established.

If we can provide a plausible

account of obligation in the case of the human

**********18**********

family, we might then be able to make use of
this account in trying to suggest a conception of
racial families.
Kurt Baier suggests what seems to be a highly
plausible

account

of moral obligation.

On

Baier's view, obligations are ascribed to persons
by way of directives, that is, "the content of
speech acts capable of guiding those to whom it
applies ... to action. ,,7 Moral directives are those
directives which, "other things being equal, it
would be (morally) wrong for the addressee not
to follow", that is, "the person to whom they
apply (morally) ought to follow."s For example:
[i]f it is morally wrong to pass by when
an injured motorist calls out for help,
then in such a situation one has a moral
obligation to give such help. Putting it
more generally, we can say that
whenever a wrong-claim indicates a task
to someone, then it constitutes a moral
directive and being the addressee of such
a moral directive amounts to having a
moral obligation.9
On Baier's view, then
obligations arise when and only when a
morally binding directive gives rise ... to
a task, whether merely self-disciplinary
or also productive ... [what transforms an

**********19**********

assignment into a task in the case of
moral
obligations]
is either
the
temptation of the addressee to do what
the directive forbids ... or the effort
needed to perform the productive task
which the directive enjoins (repair
damage done).l0
An obligation claim has moral binding force,
and hence is morally binding, if
'It is not solely the addressee's business
to decide whether or not to follow the
directive' ... [that is, such directives]
concern themselves with issues and
problems whose solution is not solely the
agent's business but also that of others
who have a legitimate concern about
whether or not the person to whom such
a directive applies follows it or not.l!
Thus the claim "'Do K' has moral binding
force", is construed by Baier as implying that
"Do K" "is a directive in regard to which there
ought to be a person whose job it is to ensure
that all those

[who are] addressees

of the

directive .. follow it."12
Hence, if we take to be morally wrong the
directive "All humans kill each other", which
addresses all members of the species, then this
constitutes a moral directive that establishes a

**********20**********

morally binding obligation between all members
of the species to refrain from killing each other.
If we grant the plausibility of Baier's account of
obligation, we can see how a moral obligation
(in this case the obligation
killing) between
species

to refrain from

all members

of the human

might be established.

This moral

obligation, then, along with the aforementioned
biological resemblances, satisfies the two criteria
that we set forth for distinguishing the family of
humankind from families as such. It would no
doubt be objected, of course, that even if we
grant this somewhat obvious distinction between
families of "things" and families of persons, this
broad conception of the family of humankind
clearly does not capture the notion of family we
seek. What is required, then, are some further
distinguishing

features that will enable us to

characterize as families those groups that we
take to be families, but which the causal and
common life views failed to adequately account
for. Let us call these groups intimate families.13
In order to distinguish our intimate family from
the larger family of humans to which we all
belong, let us consider two additional criteria.

**********21**********

Building on the criteria for the human family,
we can state the further criterion for the intimate
family as:

(3) a set of resemblances, usually

biological, and almost always psychological and
historical, such that an individual represents a
member of one or more of those groups which
we take to be fundamental

to the successful

continuation of society, wherein there is a moral
obligation between the individual and the other
group members.

This third criterion allows us

to distinguish

between

humans

smaller

and

the group/family
groups

which

consistent with how we commonly

of

seem

think of

families, e.g., as a group consisting of a mother,
a father, and one or more children.

In effect,

intimate families are subgroups, or subfamilies
if you will, of the human family.
We can see at this point that, unlike the causal
view, the intimate family concept as thus far
described seems to easily allow for gay couples,
adopted children, in-laws, etc. In contrast to the
causal view, on what I call the resemblance
view, a group of individuals need not have a
causal

biological

legitimate

family.

link

to be considered
Further,

given

a
the

requirement that the group be fundamental to the

**********22**********

successful continuation of society, we seem to
avoid having to allow as families groups larger
than our intuitions will allow.
As to the moral obligation between members of
the intimate family, we might again employ
Baier's

account

of moral

obligation.

For

example, if we hold that the directive

"All

members of those groups which we take to be
fundamental to the successful continuation of
society,

that

is,

those

groups

which

are

paramount to the training and maturation of
members of the human species, work against
each other to the detriment

of society"

morally wrong, then this constitutes
directive

that establishes

is

a moral

a morally binding

obligation between the members of those groups
to work with each other for the good of society.
The second criterion to be added is:

(4) a

family disposition (FD) between the members of
the group.
strong

What I call a FD arises from the

sense

of

emotional

and

moral

identification that we have with our intimate
families.

This identification with our intimate

families

arises, I think, as a result of the

resemblances

which

obtain

between

**********23**********

family

members. Though we share the requisite human
family resemblances with some stranger, e.g.,
the resemblances

which

we have with our

biological mother, who loved and nurtured us
and who has been a part of our lives since birth,
are such that a very intense emotional and moral
identification obtains between my mother and I
which is not even conceivable with respect to
the stranger.

Hence, I am likely to be disposed

differently towards my mother than I would be
towards a stranger.
When a FD is present, a moral prioritization
occurs with respect to those individuals amongst
whom the FD obtains. This moral prioritization
makes our obligation

towards

our intimate

family special in a very real, although perhaps
not always morally justifiable, sense. Hence, a
special

obligation

obtains

between

intimate

family members which does not obtain in the
case of others.

Consequently, we give moral

priority to members of our intimate family over
others.14 So if we suppose that, all other things
being equal, I must choose between helping a
stranger

and helping

my mother,

I would,

because of my FD towards her, choose to help
my mother rather than the stranger:s
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I would, however, like to address one concern
with respect to priority which I think will help
clarify my preference for the term "intimate"
over the term "immediate"

in characterizing

what we intuitively take to be families. As was
noted above, the causal view runs into difficulty
once individuals who do not have a causal
biological relation to each other are considered
for membership

in the
the

immediate

common

life

family.

Similarly,

on

account,

individuals

whom we do not live with are

excluded from family membership, and hence
from coming under any familial obligation. This
difficulty is avoided, however, in the case of the
intimate family on the resemblance account.
Suppose I live in New York and I have a cousin
who lives in Brazil.

Because we lack the

requisite causal relation and we do not live
together, she is excluded from my immediate
family on both the causal and common life
accounts.

Despite having only spent a few

summers together (perhaps on the beaches of
Rio), my cousin and I consider ourselves quite
close.

In fact, we share a great deal of each

other's lives by way of telephone conversations
and written correspondence.

It seems, then, that
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I might

consider

my

cousin

part

of my

immediate family, even though she fails to be
"immediate" either in the sense of a causal
relation or in the sense of physical proximity.
On the resemblance

account,

however,

my

cousin can easily be considered a member of my
intimate

family

along

with

my

biological

mother, my stepfather, my half-brother, and my
paternal uncle.

My cousin comes under the

weight of the familial obligation as outlined in
the third criterion for intimate families, and
further, I have the strong emotional and moral
identification with her which gives rise to a
feeling of a special obligation or FD towards
her.
I should

point

out that

not everyone,

for

whatever

reason, will want to include such

individuals as my cousin as part of my intimate
family. They might argue that the FD can, or at
least should, only arise with respect to certain
individuals.

This difficulty can be explained, I

think, by drawing a distinction between what I
call an internal family disposition (IFD) and an
external family disposition

(EFD).

An IFD

exists when two or more members of a family
group acknowledge

a mutual sense of moral
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prioritization

between

consider themselves
family.

themselves,

and thus

members of an intimate

Hence, my cousin and I each consider

the other as part of our intimate family.

In

contrast, the objector lacks an EFD. That is, the
objector fails to endorse the acknowledgement
of a mutual
between

sense

my cousin

of moral
and I.

prioritization
The objector,

therefore, rejects the idea that a feeling of a
special obligation or FD ought to exist in the
case of my cousin and I. So, both the objector
and I can consider my cousin in Brazil as
somehow "family", perhaps in the sense that we
are blood relations,16 but the objector holds the
view that my cousin and I are not intimate
family, while my cousin and I feel and act as
members of an intimate family.
Having thus sketched the resemblance view of
family, we can summarize

this account

as

follows. Intimate families are groups in which:
(1) the members of the group share in the
biological resemblances of the human species,
(2) the

members

of the group

share

the

psychological resemblance of a sense of moral
obligation

between

members

of the human

species, (3) the members of the group share a
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set of resemblances,

usually biological,

and

almost always psychological and historical, such
that each member is representative

of one or

more of those groups which we take to be
fundamental to the successful continuation of
society, wherein there is a moral obligation
between

the group

members,

and (4) the

members of the group share a family disposition
(FD).
The resemblance view of family, then, provides
us with a conception of family that meets the
first of the two criteria we set out to satisfy, that
is, it gives us an account of family that is able
to sustain a moral obligation between family
members. Further, by using resemblance criteria
in distinguishing families as particular kinds of
social groups, and by suggesting an explanation
of the way in which the feeling of moral
prioritization between family members occurs,
the resemblance account satisfies our intuitions
about the kind of group that families are. What
remains, therefore, is an attempt to satisfy the
second

criterion,

resemblance

that

account's

is,
ability

to

show

to provide

plausible conception of race-families.
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the
a

III
As might be expected, the conception of a racefamily on the resemblance view turns on the
resemblances

between family members.

We

begin, naturally, with the biological resemblance
of species and the psychological resemblance of
obligation to fellow members of the species that
distinguishes the human family from families as
such.
human

In order to make the move from the
family

conception

to a race-family

conception, we must add to these resemblances
other resemblances which apply to the concept
of racial commonality

in order to distinguish

race-families from the human family.
in order

to suggest

that

Further,

race-families

are

analogous to intimate families, we must generate
a moral obligation and a family disposition (FD)
between the members in order to create the kind
of moral prioritization

between

members of

race-families that we saw in our discussion of
intimate families.
Take any definition

of race that you like,

inevitably we find that there is some notion of
resemblance underlying it.

For example, take
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W.E.B. DuBois'

definition of race.

DuBois

defines race as
a vast family of human beings, generally
of common blood and language, always
of common history, traditions and
impulses, who are both voluntarily and
involuntarily striving together for the
accomplishment of certain more or less
vividly conceived ideals of life. I?
Notice that in calling for a vast "family" of
human beings, there seems to be a sense in
which DuBois embraces
families.

the notion of race-

Further, his characterization

of this

family seems to be a set of resemblances.
DuBois

calls

for

common

blood

First,

between

members of the race. If I take DuBois' use of
the term "common blood" correctly, he means a
biological
DuBois

resemblance
calls

for

of lineage.

common

Second,

language

and

impulses, and the striving for particular ideals;
which

all

seem

resemblances.

to

be

psychological

Lastly, DuBois holds that the

members of a race share a common history and
tradition,

both

resemblances.

of

which

are

historical

Hence, on DuBois' view, we

should think of groups of people who share in
the

resemblances

he

outlines

as
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a

race;

moreover, given his characterization of races as
a "vast family", perhaps as a race-family.
A simpler, and I think more straight-forward,
definition of race, of the black race in particular,
has been proposed by Bernard BoxilI.

Boxill

thinks that "insofar as black people are a race,
they are people who either themselves

look

black - that is, have a certain kind of physical
appearance - or are, at least in part, descended
from such a group ofpeople."18 We can see that
on Boxill's view, a race consists solely of the
biological

resemblances

of appearance

and

lineage.
So, if the versions of race given by DuBois and
Boxill are illustrative of how we conceive of
particular groups of people that we call races,
then however we decide to distinguish between
racial groups, the distinguishing characteristics
we invoke will be reducible to various kinds of
resemblances.

I do not think, however, that any

moral obligation, apart from any which may
apply to all members of the human family, can
be derived

from these

resemblances

alone.

Consequently, we must provide some additional
resemblance criteria in order to gain a sufficient

**********31**********

basis for establishing a moral obligation and FD
between members of a race.
Given the history of slavery,
disenfranchisement,

lynching

and

Le. oppression, associated

with individuals taken to be members of the
black race, it seems clear that blacks share
certain resemblances which are of a particularly
intense nature.

Even in the present day, the

oppression of blacks, which perpetuates their
political

and

economic

unempowerment,

remains.

As Justice Thurgood Marshall has

noted
It is unnecessary
in 20th century
America to have individual Negroes
demonstrate that they have been victims
of racial discrimination; the racism of
our society has been so pervasive that
none, regardless of wealth or position,
has managed to escape its impact. The
experience of Negroes in America has
been different in kind, not just in degree,
from that of other ethnic groups. It is
not merely the history of slavery alone
but also that a whole people were
marked as inferior by the law. And that
mark has endured.19
If Mr. Justice

Marshall

is correct

in his

assessment of blacks, and I think that few would
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deny that he is, and we take the oppression of
groups in general to be morally wrong, then it
follows that the oppression of blacks as a group
is morally wrong.

Drawing

again on our

discussion of moral obligation, we might suggest
that, just as the moral directive "Help those in
need" gives rise to an obligation to help an
injured motorist who is stranded and asks for
help, the moral directive "Stop the oppression of
blacks" gives rise to an obligation to help in
mitigating, if not eliminating, the tyranny which
the black race continues to endure.
would

appear

that

blacks

have

Hence it
moral

justification for acting in concert with each other
as a means of ending the oppression that they all
share.
But it seems that blacks have recognized this
obligation all along. According to William Van
Deburg, this shared oppression amongst blacks
has long been a catalyst for group action.

On

Van Deburg's account of black history
Before the Civil War, for example, black
Americans
worked to develop an
empowering sense of group identity by
distinguishing us from them - often to
startling effect. As they adjusted to the
reality of oppression,
free blacks
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determined that it would be wise to
"combine and closely attend to their own
particular interest". Conscious of their
shared experiences and cultural traits [i.e.
their shared resemblances], they formed
fraternal, mutual aid, and cooperative
organizations to promote black solidarity
and aid in racial surviva1.20

Further, group action by blacks in response to
oppression and the obligation

felt by blacks

towards each other, exists even today.

David

Wilkins, in his discussion of an obligation on
the part of black professionals

to the black

community at large, tells us that
For those blacks whose membership in
the black community is central to their
identity, recognizing the existence of
such an obligation promotes both a
healthy self-love and a firm foundation
for helping other blacks who are truly in
need. In a country filled with negative
images of black identity arid millions of
poor blacks, a theory that reinforces a
positive sense of black self-worth and
that encourages concrete action to help
blacks in need carries real moral
weight.21
We should note two things at this point.

First,

the moral directive to help blacks, and hence the
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morally binding obligation which it entails, is
not exclusive to blacks.

The obligation to end

the oppression of blacks falls on all those who
are in a position to reduce or eliminate that
oppression.

If it is morally wrong to allow the

oppression of blacks to continue, then the moral
obligation to stop that oppression applies to all
moral agents.

Given that whites are moral

agents, and further that as a group whites have
historically been the oppressors of blacks, whites
are clearly addressees of the moral directive, and
hence the morally binding obligation, to help
blacks. Hence, the task of helping blacks out of
their oppressed state falls firmly upon whites as
well as blacks.
Second, not only do the resemblances which
obtain between

members

of the black race

establish them as an oppressed group, and hence
bring them under the moral directive to stop the
oppression

of groups, because of the strong

emotional and moral identification that results
from this shared oppression, these resemblances
are of sufficient intensity to give rise to a family
disposition (FD) between members of the black
race as well.
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If this is the case, then just as in the case of our
intimate family, the resemblances which obtain
between the members of the black race give rise
to a feeling of moral prioritization between its
members.

Of course, this is not to say that this

sense of prioritization,

that is, the FD which

arises between members of the black race, is
equal in intensity, necessarily, to the FD that
obtains

between

intimate

family

members.

Clearly, the resemblances which obtain in the
intimate family, if only by virtue of their very
intimate nature, seem likely to prompt a higher
level of concern for intimate family members
than do the resemblances

associated with the

shared oppression that comes with membership
in the black race. However, the FD generated
between

members

of

the

black

race

is

nevertheless analogous to that of the intimate
family in that it yields a sense of moral priority
with respect to the care of members of the racefamily over

nonmembers.

Hence,

on the

resemblance view of family, we can, I think, see
a sense in which the race-family

conception

becomes plausible. On the resemblance account
we are able to explain both what families are
and what race-families

are in a way that is
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consistent with our intuitions and which sustains
a moral obligation between family members.
However,

one

might

object

to the

moral

prioritization between members of the black race
by claiming that such a view would be selfdefeating for blacks.

Universalization

of the

notion of giving moral priority to members of
one's own race would prove disadvantageous to
the black community.

Bill Lawson, e.g., while

admitting that the notion of blacks as a family
has "deep psychological

roots",22 nevertheless

challenges the race-family concept because he
thinks that
it is not a moral positIOn that black
Americans want to universalize. Blacks
do not want whites to be totally
committed to ... looking out for one's
racial family first. Most blacks want to
be treated as moral and social equals.
The appeal to race-as-family morality
would undermine the basic political and
moral principles that have been used to
get blacks what civil liberties they have
.... Blacks lack sufficient political and
economic power in America to push such
a moral position as a universal moral
principle. Races can still be considered
families, but we do not want that concept
to be the basis of moral obligation.23
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Lawson appears to be making two distinct
claims here. His first claim seems to be that
embracing the race-family conception is selfdefeating for black Americans since it "would
undermine

the

basic

political

and

moral

principles that have been used to get blacks
what civil liberties they have".

His second

claim seems to be that blacks do not have the
political and economic

power to universally

implement a race-family morality. Since I have
nothing to say in opposition to Lawson's second
claim, as it seems clearly to be the case, I shall
only take issue with his first claim.
Of course having no objection to the second of
Lawson's claims is not to say that I do not find
it of importance.

In fact, I think that the second

claim,

its

given

consistency

with

the

aforementioned oppression of blacks, adds to the
force of my rejoinder to Lawson's first claim.
It is precisely because blacks lack sufficient
political and economic power in America that
they

ought

conception.

to

embrace

the

race-family

It is precisel y because

of the

oppression of blacks that blacks need the help
which the solidarity of the race-family provides.
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As to the universalization

of the race-family

concept, we should first consider that in working
together as a family, blacks are simply following
the "example of Euro-American
the

Irish)

[by]

promot[ing]

groups ([e.g.]
their

own

organizational activity"; though blacks are not
countenancing the notion that "their exclusive
effort necessarily

separate[ s] them from the

concerns of the 'whole human family'".24

I

think that the problem Lawson envisions is the
result of his conception of moral prioritization
with respect to race-family obligations. Lawson
seems to think that the universalization

of the

race-family conception would have a negative
effect on the accomplishments

towards social

equality that blacks have made thus far because
whites, now invoking a race-family obligation of
their own, would place each other morally first,
and thereby

relegate

blacks

to a situation

perhaps worse than their current one. However,
even though we tend to consider choosing an
intimate family member over a stranger when
circumstances

are

such

that

choosing

the

intimate family member may seem inappropriate,
or even morally unjustified, we do not always
choose the family member.

Thus, the priority

we place on family members is not absolute, and
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therefore the moral prioritization among racefamily members does not necessarily entail a
total commitment to considering one's own racefamily members first. So although blacks may
feel a special obligation (FD) towards fellow
members

of

prioritization

the

black

race-family,

the

members

over

of race-family

others is not necessarily absolute.
An almost trivial, although illustrative, example
of the

dynamic

nature

of

familial

moral

prioritization might arise, again in the case of a
choice between

my mother

and a stranger.

Clearly, if my mother and the stranger have both
been in an automobile accident, and after being
the first to arrive on the scene I discover that
my mother has broken her leg and the stranger
is suffering from arterial bleeding, even though
my tendency may be to help my mother first, I
will no doubt stop the stranger's bleeding before
I consider helping my mother.

Thus, "family

first" is not always the case.
Perhaps a more realistic example of the type of
prioritization which I think is implicit in the
resemblance account of race-families, and the
kind of prioritization that I think has already
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been demonstrated by other groups, might begin
by supposing that an intimate family member is
in dire financial need after just opening a new
business.

Everything else being equal, I may

take it as an obligation to patronize my family
member's new business over all other businesses
(of the same type) as a means of helping my
family member.
member

priority

Thus I have given the family
for no other

reason

than

because of my feeling of obligation and FD
towards him or her. Similarly, and as has been
done historically by other groups, one may, for
no other reason than that of a feeling of
obligation and FD towards a member of the
black community, show a sense of priority with
respect to members of the black race-family by
patronizing a black-owned business rather than
a white-owned one in an effort to enhance the
social and economic condition of the black race.
Further, given our discussion above, I think that
an argument could be made suggesting that this
particular manifestation of the obligation and FD
is at least morally acceptable.
take

seriously

the

In addition, if we

obligation

to stop

the

oppression of blacks, then in this case whites too
should

consider

businesses.

patronizing

black

owned

Not that whites should patronize
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black owned businesses out of a FD arising from
the intense resemblances shared among blacks,
but because of the moral directive, and hence
the morally binding obligation, to help blacks
out of their oppressed state that applies to all
those who are in a position to provide such help.
Consider what is perhaps the classic statement
of a universal
imperative:

morality,

Kant's

categorical

"Act only on that maxim through

which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal

law."2S

Clearly,

assistance to blacks (or for that matter to any
oppressed group) whether by blacks themselves
because of a race-family obligation, or by others
to whom the moral directive which is the basis
for that obligation applies, is sufficient grounds
for a maxim which we can will as a universal
law. The only question that remains, I think, is
whether or not the black middle-class will opt to
ignore its obligation to less fortunate members
of the black race-family

and segregate itself

from those members of the black community
who are in need of their assistance, or whether
they will step forward and meet that obligation.
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NOTES
1.

Appiah, p. 15. Although Appiah here

uses the singular "parent", since both parents
are causally responsible for any offspring, I
take him to mean the causal responsibility of
both parents,with the domestic unit consisting
of either one parent and a child, or a man, a
woman and a child.
2.

Appiah, p. 16 n. 4.

3.

Appiah, p. 15.

4.

Appiah, p. 15.

5.

Since Appiah does not specify what

functions constitute positive functions, I shall
assume that any function which does not
appear to be negative qualifies as positive.
6.

No claim of a resemblance ontology is

being made herein.
7.

Baier, p. 210.

8.

Baier, p. 211, emphasis in the original.

**********43**********

9.

Baier, p. 212, emphasis in the original.

10.

Baier, p. 213, emphasis in the original.

11.

Baier, p. 223, emphasis in the original.

Baier argues that:

"since the behavior of a

person who yields to the temptation to follow
self-interest and to ignore moral directives
will, ipso facto, detrimentally affect another
person's interests, the question of whether or
not he follows moral directives is ipso facto
not solely his business but someone else's as
well, namely, the business of the person whose
interest would be adversely affected. And
since such behavior, unless prevented, would
adversely affect the climate of life, whether or
not people follow moral directives, is
everyone's business (225)."
12.

Baier, p. 224, emphasis in the original.

13.

I shall use the term "intimate" rather

than "immediate" in discussing our intuitive
understanding of family, since, as we shall see
below, there are problems with regard to how
we prioritize our obligations such that those
who are "immediate" family may not have the
same moral standing as others with whom we
**********44**********

are intimate.
14.

There may be a concern here with

respect to the is/ought problem. As Lawrence
Becker points out, "[clommon sense morality
gives more weight to the interests of intimates
than to strangers, but moral theory has had
difficulty justifying that priority" (Becker, p.
177; Becker addresses what he calls the
priority problem at pp. 216-26, invoking the
notion of reciprocity as a means of solving it).
Although it seems that there might be many
instances in which we could morally justify a
priority to intimate family members, there will
no doubt be instances where priority is given
to our intimate family members even when it
is not justified morally.

I am here attempting

only to suggest how it is that this prioritization
comes about, not to take on the larger task of
justifying the more contentious claim that there
ought to be such a prioritization.

15.

A fuller account of the resemblance

view would go on to explain how a similar
dilemma between my mother and my father,
e.g., towards whom I have a similarly inspired
FD, might be resolved, perhaps by appealing
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to the intensity of specific resemblances and
explaining how a stonger FD towards my
mother might develop.
16.

It should be noted that, in light of the

first three criteria for families, the resemblance
view clearly accounts for what we might call
"extended" families, however, I am here trying
to focus on what we take to be our immediate
family, Le. that group of individuals to whom
we have a special familial obligation.
17. DuBois, p. 21.
18.

Box ill, p. 178.

19.

Marshall, pp. 132-133.

20.

Van Deburg, p. 34.

21.

Wilkins, p. 2001.

22.

Lawson, p. 98.

23.

Lawson, p. 107.

24.

Van Deburg, p. 35. Note Van

Deburg's use of the term "human family".
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25.

Kant, p. 88.

26. I would like to thank Marion Smiley,
Daniel Hausman and Joseph Ellin for their
comments on earlier versions of this paper;
the Committee on Institutional Cooperation
(CIC) for financial support during the early
stages of the paper's development; the
Graduate School of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison

for financial support

during the completion of the current version;
and Bill Lawson whose work inspired this
paper. An earlier version of this paper was
presented during the October 1994 CIC
Fellows Conference held at the University of
Minnesota.
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University College, Dublin, Ireland
No.3 & 4, May, 1993
Reasonable Children
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
No. 5 & 6, June, 1993
Helping to Harm? The Ethical Dilemmas of
Managing Politically Sensitive Data
Sylvie C. Tourigny
Western Michigan University
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VOLUME VII
No.1, September, 1993
Why Does Utilitarianism Seem Plausible?
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
No.2, November, 1993
Can We Share Ethical
Religions?
Robert Hannaford
Ripon College

Views

with

Other

No.3, February, 1994
Narrative, Luck and Ethics: The Role of Chance
in Ethical Encounters, in Literarure and Real
Life Experiences
Nona Lyons
University of Southern Maine
No.4, February, 1994
Human Rights in the Social Sciences
Erika Loeffler Friedl
Western Michigan University
VOLUME VIII
No.1, January, 1995
Michigan's Deadlocked Commission on Death
and Dying: A Lesson in Politics and Legalism
Joseph Ellin
Western Michigan University
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No.2, February, 1995
Two Papers on Environmentalism
I: Environmental Ethics and Value in the World
John Post
Vanderbilt University
No.3, March, 1995
Two Papers on Environmentalism
II: Resources and Environmental Policy
Jan Narveson
University of Waterloo
No.4, May, 1995
Race, Family, and Obligation
Rodney C. Roberts
University of Wisconsin
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WINTER 1995 PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS
January 16

Rodney C. Roberts
Doctoral Candidate in Philosophy
University of Wisconsin
Race, Family, and Obligation

February 8

Tobin Siebers
Professor of English &
Comparative Literature
University of Michigan
Postmodernism and the Ethics of
Skepticism

February 17

Shirley Bach
Professor of Philosophy
Western Michigan University
Donald Batts
Clinical Research Manager
The Upjohn Company
Arthur Feinberg
Pediatrician
Bridget Tucker Gonder
Director, Risk Management
Borgess Medical Center
Research Ethics: A Contemporary
Critique of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Experiment

March 17

Wade Robison
Ezra A. Hale Professor in Applied
Ethics
Rochester Institute of Technology
PBB Revisited: Making
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Reasonable Decisions About the
Environment

March 20

Victor Vaughen
Consultant
Engineering and Business Ethics
Consulting Services
The Fascination and Lure of
Ethics: Professional and
Business Ethics

March 21

Victor Vaughen
Consultant
Engineering and Business Ethics
Consulting Services
Professional and Business Ethics:
A Work in Progress

March 23

Robert Root-Bernstein
Associate Professor of Physiology
Michigan State University
Rethinking AIDS

April 6

Paul Farber and Panelists
Professor of Education and
Professional Development
Western Michigan University
Character Education in the
Schools: A Panel Discussion

**********59**********

MEMBERSHIP
Membership in the Ethics Center is open to anyone
interested. There is no membership fee, although
donations to cover publishing costs are appreciated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------Please enroll me as a member of the WMU Center
for the Study of Ethics in Society.

ame:

_

Mailing Address:,

Institutional Affiliation:

_

-----------

------------------------------------------------------------------------Send to:

Center for the Study of
Ethics in Society
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, MI 49008

The Center publishes papers of interest to its readers.
Distribution is free to members. Additional copies
may be obtained for $2.00 by writing to the Center.
Uthograph on Front Cover:
The Oaklands, Western Michigan University

